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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
states of a needed source of income to which they are entitled.
And, even more important, it has given new life to a constitutional
doctrine which is clearly outmoded and unfair. The Court has
grabbed a statute and broadened its application to an extent never
before intended in its attempt to avoid passing on the principal
issue. It was hoped that the Court, when it agreed to hear this
appeal, would take advantage of the opportunity to examine the
federal immunity doctrine in the light of today's needs, of today's
banking policy of fostering competitive equality, and of today's
banking system and the metamorphosis that it has undergone since
the Supreme Court last passed upon the issues here involved.
Instead, the decision rendered was merely a verification that past
law still applies regardless of new developments, and only the dis-
sent realized the true impact that this opinion could have provided.
Let us again hope that the Court, when and if it should decide to
hear a case of similar import will re-evaluate its holding in the
instant case and determine to take on the task of facing the consti-
tutional issue squarely, as it should have done here.
X
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SELF-INcRIMINATION - GAMBLER'S
ASSERTION OF SELF-INCRIMINATION PRIVILEGE CONSTITUTES DE-
FENSE FOR VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL WAGERING TAX STATUTES-
Petitioner, convicted of violating the federal wagering tax statutes
by conspiring to evade and wilfully failing to pay the annual occu-
pation tax, and failing to register with the Internal Revenue
Service as required by law, unsuccessfully argued to the trial court
that these statutory requirements violated his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. On certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the provisions could
not be utilized to impose criminal sanctions on persons who prop-
erly asserted the privilege as a defense for non-compliance.
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
In recent years, the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination ' has become the center of a continuing controversy
concerning the balance of individual liberties and public interest.
A major aspect of this conflict has involved the application and
enforcement of the Federal Gambling Stamp Tax.2 This tax re-
quires all professional gamblers to purchase an annual fifty dollar
I "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 4401-23, 6107.
[ VOL. 43
RECENT DECISIONS
gambling stamp3 and to register with the director of their local
internal revenue district.4  The gambling tax plan further provides
that lists of registrants be furnished to state prosecuting authorities
upon proper application, 5 and that payment of the tax does not
exempt any person from penalties imposed by state and federal
gambling laws.4 Thus a constitutional conflict arises since the
gambler, while avoiding the penalties of non-compliance,7 reveals
his violations of state gambling laws.
The constitutionality of federal taxing schemes leveled in
whole or in part at criminal activities has frequently been upheld
by the United States Supreme Court. As early as 1866, in the
License Tax Cases,9 the Court found no objection to a federal act
requiring the payment of a "special tax" (i.e., purchase of a
license) by sellers of lottery tickets and retail liquor dealers,
although such activities were expressly declared illegal in certain
states. The granting of the license was regarded simply as a
means of special taxation which in no way authorized the licensee
to conduct such business within the state.' 0 The idea that the
federal government was not prohibited from taxing allegedly illegal
activities was expressed as a more formal rule in United States v.
Stafoff ," wherein the Supreme Court upheld the principle that
"Congress may tax what it also forbids."" United States v.
Constantine,3 on the other hand, involved a special federal tax on
3 "There shall be imposed a special tax of $50 per year to be paid
by each person who is liable for tax under section 4401 or who is engaged
in receiving wagers for or on behalf of any person so liable." INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, § 4411.
4 "Each person required to pay a special tax under this subchapter shall
register with the official in charge of the internal revenue district-(I) his
name and place of residenc ; (2) if he is liable for tax under subchapter
A, each place of business where the activity which makes him so liable is
carried on, and the name and place of residence of 'each person who is
engaged in receiving wagers for him or on his behalf; and (3) if he is
engaged in receiving wagers for or on behalf of any person liable for tax
under subchapter A, the name and place of residence of leach such person."
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §4412(a).
5INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 6107.
6 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 4422.
7 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 6653, 7201, 7203, 7262.
s See, Note, Self-Icrihmination and the Federal Excise Tax on Wager-
ing, 76 YALE L.J. 839, 847 (1967). For a detailed compilation of state
gambling statutes see Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44 n.5 (1968).
972 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462 (1866).
'old. at 471.
"2 260 U.S. 477 (1923). The Court relied on United States v. Yugino-
vich, 256 U.S. 450 (1921), wherein the power of Congress to tax the pro-
duction of intoxicating liquors was upheld even though such production was
prohibited by law.
"2 260 U.S. at 480.
13 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
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a retail malt liquor business operated in violation of the laws of
Alabama. The Court held that the special tax in question was
actually a penalty imposed for a violation of state law, regardless
of what it may have been called. The Court concluded that if
what appears to be an occupational tax is in reality a penalty, it
cannot be changed into a tax by merely calling it a tax. Rather,
the nature of the measure must be determined by its purpose, sub-
stance and application. 14 Thus, it was decided that Congress was
simply attempting to usurp state powers under the "guise" of a tax
in violation of the tenth amendment.' 5 The effect of Constantine,
however, was greatly limited by the clarification later made in
Sonzinsky v. United States.'6 The Court declared that the prin-
ciples set down in Constantine were not applicable to taxes which
contained registration provisions obviously in support of a valid
revenue purpose and where the subject of the tax was not treated
as criminal by the taxing statute. If the tax appeared to be a
valid exercise of the taxing power, it would not be any less so
because it was burdensome or restricted the subject of the tax in
some way.'
7
The first constitutional challenge to the wagering tax provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code was rejected by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Kahriger.'s The defendant, who was
engaged in the business of accepting wagers, had been indicted on
charges of failing to comply with the registration and occupational
tax provisions of the Code. However, the district court found
this tax scheme unconstitutional on the authority of Constantine.
The United States Supreme Court, in reversing, noted that Son-
zinsky had distinguished the Constantine case from the present
situation, for the wagering tax was levied on all persons in the
business of accepting wagers, whether state law declared such
activity illegal or not.' 9 Thus, the Code provisions were upheld
as valid extensions of the federal taxing power, in no way infring-
ing upon the police powers reserved to the states by the tenth
amendment. Relying on the License Tax Cases and Sonzinsky,
the Court concluded that the scheme was not a mere "guise" to
penalize illegal state gambling activities. Even though there were
certain regulatory requirements, it did produce substantial revenue
and was thus valid as a revenue measure.2 0
14 Id. at 294.
15 Id. at 296.
10 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
17 Id. at 513.
18345 U.S. 22 (1953).
19 Id. at 25-26.
20 Id. at 26-28. The Court felt that the registration requirements did not
make the tax offensive but, rather, merely facilitated the collection of the
tax and thereby aided in the revenue purpose. Id. at 31-32.
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Consequently, since these regulatory taxation schemes were
generally upheld as valid extensions of the federal taxing power,
constitutional attack was possible only as to the application of the
law. One of these constitutional grounds was based on the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The traditional test which sets forth the standards under which
the privilege may be properly asserted was first established in the
English case of Queen v. Boyes.21 If a court found, after examin-
ing the circumstances of the case, and the nature of the evidence
to be provided, that there was a "real and appreciable" danger of
incrimination to be apprehended by a witness from his being com-
pelled to answer, he should be entitled to assert the privilege.22
It was also noted that the court should take into account the pos-
sibility of an otherwise innocent question being the "'link in a
chain' of evidence" which might lead to conviction of the answering
party for another offense.
23
The tests established in Boyes were broadly applied by the
United States Supreme Court in Counselman v. Hitchcock,24 which
set down certain standards for immunity statutes that might sup-
plant the self-incrimination privilege. Such a statute would be
valid only if it provided protection as broad in scope and effect as
the constitutional prohibition itself. It could only supplant the
privilege if it provided "absolute immunity" against any future
prosecutions for the offense related to the question asked. In
other words, the use of evidence as an investigatory lead must be
barred either by the privilege or by the statute which attempted
to replace the privilege. 25 However, the standards for determining
when the privilege might be invoked were stated by the Supreme
Court in Brown v. Walker.'0 Here, the Court stressed the "real
and appreciable" danger test as the criterion for allowing assertion
of the privilege. The Court refused to extend the Counselhnan
rule as far as would be necessary to defeat the immunity clause in
question, fearing that the privilege might be used to protect a
witness from an imaginary danger in order to actually protect a
third party.
It is important to emphasize, as was done in Mason v. United
States' 7 that the final determination of whether an answer might
21 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (1861).
221d. at 738. The Boyes court further specified "real and appreciable"
danger as not being a "danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character,
having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so
improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his con-
duct." Id.
23 Id.
24142 U.S. 547 (1892).
251d. at 585-86.
26 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
27 244 U.S. 362 (1917).
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tend to incriminate a witness is a question to be decided solely by
the trial court in its discretion rather than by the witness himself.
If the court, in examining the circumstances of the case,28 should
find that there exist no reasonable grounds on which to base an
apprehension that a direct answer might prove dangerous to the
witness, then the court should compel such witness to answer.
A clarification of what is meant by "reasonable grounds" is pro-
vided in Hoffman v. United States.2 9  For the court to sustain
a claim of privilege, it need only be found that, by implication from
the question asked and under the circumstances in which it is
posed, a response or an explanation for a failure to respond might
prove dangerous in that an "injurious disclosure" could result.30
The possibility that taxes on illegal activities might pose a
serious fifth amendment problem was first raised in United States
v. Sullivan.31 Here, the defendant, whose income was largely
derived from businesses in violation of the National Prohibition
Act, refused to file a return of net income under the Revenue Act
of 1921. While suggesting that it would probably be an extreme
use of the self-incrimination privilege to allow a person to refuse
to state the amount of his income simply because it had been
derived from illegal activities, the Court did not consider the con-
stitutional claims asserted by the defendant. The Court concluded
that if the defendant had desired to object to some of the questions
on the return, he should have done so on the form itself, but that
he had no right to refuse to make out any return at all.32
The Court in United States v. Kahriger33 held that the appli-
cation of the gambling tax provisions of the Code was not viola-
tive of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Considering the rules laid down in Sullivan, the Court found it
difficult to perceive how such a claim could be asserted, since the
defendant had failed to register for the wagering tax in the first
place. Even if the respondent should be allowed to raise the self-
incrimination issue, the Court held that the privilege related to
past acts only and not to prospective acts that might not even be
28Id. at 365. See also Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374-75
(1951), for an example of how such "circumstandes" might be defined.
29 341 U.S. 479 (1951). See also Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159
(1950).
30341 U.S. at 486-87. The "injurious disclosure" test was reiterated in
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964), in which the Supreme Court held
that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is applicable
to the states under the fourteenth.
31274 U.S. 259 (1927).
32 "He could not draw a conjurer's circle around the whole matter by
his own declaration that to write any word upon the government blank
would bring him into danger of the law." Id. at 264.
33 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
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committed. 34  The Court noted that "[u]nder the registration pro-
visions of the wagering tax, appellee is not compelled to confess
to acts already committed, he is merely informed by the statute
that in order to engage in the business of wagering in the future
he must fulfill certain conditions." 3
While Kahriger upheld the Gambling Stamp Tax as constitu-
tional, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in separate
dissenting opinions, warned that the Code provisions constituted
serious infringements upon the self-incrimination privilege. Mr.
Justice Black viewed the entire scheme as a "squeezing device"
which is really "a coerced confession" that the registrant has vio-
lated state gambling laws.36 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's attack was
even more to the point. He asserted that Congress could not
compel such self-incriminatory disclosures keyed to aid the enforce-
ment of state gambling statutes "under the guise" of a revenue
measure which was so obviously not created for revenue purposes.
3 7
The constitutionality of the wagering tax provisions, as estab-
lished in Kahriger, was strongly affirmed in Lewis v. United
States.3s  The Court once again could find no fifth amendment
violations since it saw nothing compulsory about the required dis-
closures. Petitioner would only have to pay the tax and make the
necessary disclosures if he freely elected to enter such business.
Thus, the only act compelled was that "would-be gamblers" make
some sort of decision. The Court could find nothing wrong with
the compulsion of such a choice, for it simply meant that a person
might have to refrain from gambling-and there is no constitutional
right to gamble. But Justice Black, again in dissent, indicated
that while no such constitutional right exists, gamblers, as citizens,
are nonetheless entitled to protection under the fifth amendment.39
It should be noted that certain collateral lines of authority
have developed in the area of self-incrimination, and these have
frequently been suggested as reasons to preclude assertion of the
privilege in the gambling stamp cases. In Shapiro v. United
States,40 it was held that the privilege did not extend to records
34 Id. at 32. The sole authority the Court cited in support of its state-
ments concerning the privilege's application was Wigmore, who concluded
that "there is no compulsory self-incrimination in a rule of law which
merely requires beforehand a future report on a class of future acts among
which a particular one may or may not in the future be criminal at the
choice of the party reporting." 8 J. WiGmoRE, EViDENcE §2259(c) (3d
ed. 1940).
35 345 U.S. at 32-33.
36 Id. at 36-37 (dissenting opinion).
37 Id. at 38-40 (dissenting opinion).
38 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
39 Id. at 425 (dissenting opinion).
40335 U.S. 1 (1948). The Court here reaffirmed what was said in dic-
tum in Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911).
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required to be kept by law as a means of acquiring needed in-
formation concerning transactions properly regulable by the gov-
ernment. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,41 on the other hand,
introduced a line of authority which attempted to broaden the
scope of the privilege. Murphy established that a state witness
could not be compelled to answer questions if his responses might
incriminate him under federal laws, unless absolutely protected
under an immunity statute from all criminal prosecutions. The
Court preserved the self-incrimination privilege here by imposing
certain "use restrictions" on the federal authorities. It forbade
them from using as evidence such testimony and its fruits as might
be compelled during the state proceedings in question. The wit-
ness could now freely answer questions on the state level without
fear of any infringement upon his fifth amendment privilege.
The significance of the distinction between past and prospec-
tive acts, which served as a basis for the rationales in Kahriger
and Lewis, was seriously undermined in Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Board.4 2 It was held that the registration form
and statement compelling admission of membership in, and details
about, the Communist Party, required by the Subversive Activities
Control Act, were violative of the fifth amendment privilege. It
was found that these forms might be used as evidence in, or supply
leads to, criminal prosecutions under the Smith Act and similar
statutes, even though such infornation did not directly reveal the
commission of any past criminal acts. Albertson also distinguished
Sullivan, pointing out that the income tax form questions there
were "neutral on their face and directed at the public at large,"
while those in the instant case were aimed at a "highly selective
group inherently suspect of criminal activities." Thus, whereas
the questions at issue in Sullivan were in an essentially non-
criminal regulatory sphere, those at issue in Albertson were
inquiries into an "area permeated with criminal statutes." The
Court, therefore, concluded that it was entirely possible that an
answer to any question on the forms required by the Subversive
Activities Control Board could very easily involve the admission
of a necessary element in a variety of crimes.
The self-incrimination problem posed by the gambling tax and
related provisions becomes much more significant when one ob-
serves how frequently the information required by these Code
provisions has been admitted as evidence in state criminal prosecu-
tions. For example, Irvine v. California43 upheld a state gambling
41378 U.S. 52 (1964). Here the Court overruled Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944), which held that compelled testimony which
might incriminate a state witness under federal law could be introduced as
evidence in federal courts, notwithstanding a state immunity statute.
42 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
43347 U.S. 128 (1953).
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conviction for bookmaking, even though the conviction had been
obtained by the admission into evidence of the defendant's federal
wagering tax stamp and documents from the United States Collec-
tor of Internal Revenue." Furthermore, many states have gone
as far as to impose penalties and restrictions on persons who
simply possess the wagering stamp.4 5 And, in a recent case, mere
ownership or possession of the stamp was held to be prima facie
evidence of guilt for violations of state gambling or lottery laws.46
One exception to this line of decisions, however, held that posses-
sion of the gambling stamp was only evidentiary of an intent to
gamble in the future.4 7
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
the instant case to determine whether the federal wagering tax
statutory provisions were consistent with the limitations imposed
by the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and
thereby establish whether the leading cases of Kahriger and Lewis
still had vitality.
In Marchetti v. United States," the Court thoroughly dis-
cussed the entire taxing scheme, and then noted the many federal
and state statutes imposing criminal penalties on various gambling
activities. It stressed especially the variety of measures adopted
by Connecticut, where petitioner allegedly conducted his activities,
for the punishment of gambling and wagering, and the ease with
44For other instances in which the federal wagering stamp or registra-
tion forms have been admitted as evidence in state gambling prosecutions,
see United States v. Zizzo, 338 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1964) (wagering tax
return used as evidence in securing gambling conviction); State v. Baum,
230 La. 247, 88 So. 2d 209 (1956) (wagering tax return admitted in secur-
ing gambling conviction); State v. Reinhardt, 229 La. 673, 86 So. 2d
530 (1956) (letter from United States Treasury Department that defendant
owned wagering stamp admitted as evidence in prosecution for operating a
lottery); State v. Curry, 92 Ohio App. 1, 109 N.E.2d 298 (1952) (wager-
ing tax return admitted as evidence in conviction of defendant ot being
a common gambler); Commonwealth v. Forine, 202 Pa. Super. 88, 195
A.2d 119 (1963) (gambling stamp used as evidence to show that defendant
had control over poolroom where lottery equipment was found); McClary
v. State, 211 Tenn. 46, 362 S.W.2d 450 (1962) (possession of stamp and
tax returns made upon it Were considered to be a presumption that defend-
ant had gambled during period covered by stamp and returns); Acklen v.
State, 196 Tenn. 314, 267 S.W.2d 101 (1954) (fact that federal wagering
stamps had been issued to defendants was evidence that they engaged in
gambling activities).
45See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §28-4 (1965) (all who possess
stamp must register with county clerk and failure to do so is punishable
by imprisonment). See also Deitch v. City of Chattanooga, 195 Tenn. 245,
258 S.W.2d 776 (1953) (upholding a city ordinance prohibiting possession
of stamp).
46 Grigg v. State, 37 Ala. App. 605, 73 So. 2d 382 (1954).47 Boynton v. State, 75 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1954).
48 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
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which information acquired through the federal wagering tax laws
is made available to state and federal authorities to enforce their
respective penalties. In light of these circumstances, the Court
agreed that wagering most certainly was "an area permeated with
criminal statutes," and that those so engaged are a group "in-
herently suspect of criminal activities." Therefore, the require-
ments of the registration and occupational tax provisions actually
did create for petitioner a "real and appreciable" hazard of self-
incrimination. It was felt that the compelled information might
very well serve as a "link in a chain" of evidence that would lead
to a subsequent conviction. It was apparent, then, that these
provisions of the wagering tax requirements would have the direct
and unmistakable consequence of incriminating the petitioner.
In light of these observations, the Court concluded that the
Kahriger decision was unwarranted in finding that a registrant who
failed to assert the privilege to Treasury officials at the exact time
the payments were due irretrievably abandoned his constitutional
protections under the fifth amendment. The Court felt that no
more could be required of petitioner than to have asserted at and
after trial that the statutory requirements were unconstitutional.
Since every disclosure could have served to incriminate him, for
petitioner to have asserted his claim at the time of filing would
have forced him to prove guilt to avoid admitting it. The Court
also found that the Lewis assertions based on a lack of a constitu-
tional right to gamble could no longer be considered persuasive
reasoning. The critical question was whether the gambler would
be forced to give evidence against himself after violating state law
rather than whether he possessed a right to violate such law in
the first place. It must be understood that the privilege was
intended to protect the guilty and imprudent as well as the inno-
cent and foresighted. The privilege could not be waived simply
because "those 'inherently suspect of criminal activities' have been
commqnded to cease wagering or to provide information incriminat-
ing to themselves, and have ultimately elected to do neither." 49
The Court also rejected the argument that the statute was
entirely prospective and that, therefore, the privilege was un-
available. The Court pointed out that the fulfillment of the regis-
tration and occupational tax requirements, in focusing attention
on the registrant as a gambler, increased the likelihood that past
and present offenses would be discovered and punished. The
Court went on to find that there was no foundation for the
Kahriger conclusion that the- privilege was inapplicable to prospec-
tive acts, for it "is not mere time to which the law must look, but
the substantiality of the risks of incrimination." 50 Furthermore,
491d. at 52.
50 Id. at 54.
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the required disclosures did create "real and appreciable" hazards
of self-incrimination as to the registrant's prospective acts, for they
would not only increase the likelihood of prosecutions for such acts
but would also provide evidence that would facilitate future con-
victions. Thus, the Marchetti Court reached the conclusion that
nothing in the Kahriger and Lewis rationales would preclude peti-
tioner from asserting the self-incrimination privilege as a defense
in the instant case.
The Court also found that this case was not within the excep-
tion to the privilege established by the required records doctrine.
The three essentials of the required records doctrine described in
Suzpiro were absent in the instant case and thus the use of the
doctrine was precluded. Marchetti was required to provide in-
formation about his gambling activities that was not related to any
records he customarily maintained; there were no "public aspects"
to any of the information he was compelled to divulge, since all
questions were to be answered by the registrant in his capacity as
a private individual; and the inquiries in the present case were
directed at a group "inherently suspect of criminal activities."
Finally, the Court rejected the suggestion that it permit the
statutory requirements to remain in effect with full force by pro-
tecting those who claim the privilege through the imposition of use
restrictions similar to those in Murphy. It was concluded that it
would not be appropriate for the Court to impose such restrictions,
for in so doing it would in effect defeat a primary purpose behind
enactment of the measure and hamper the enforcement of state
prohibitions against gambling. It is the task of Congress, not the
Supreme Court, to create an appropriate balance between the con-
flicting demands of the federal treasury and state gambling pro-
hibitions.
In the companion case to Marchetti, Grosso v. United States,r'
a conviction for willful failure to pay the excise and occupational
taxes required under the wagering provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code and for conspiracy to defraud the United States
by evading payment of both taxes was reversed in its entirety
by the Supreme Court. Applying the same arguments relied on
in Marchetti, the Court held that a proper assertion of the self-
incrimination privilege, in light of the comprehensive statutory
system for the punishment of gambling adopted by Pennsylvania
(the state in which petitioner allegedly accepted wagers), would
constitute a complete defense to the prosecution for failure to
pay the excise tax. Furthermore, even though petitioner did not
assert a claim of privilege as to the conspiracy and occupational
tax counts, the Court was unable to view his failure as an effective
waiver of the privilege.
z-1 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
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In a strongly worded dissent, 2 Mr. Chief Justice Warren
explained why he felt the Marchetti and Grosso convictions should
be affirmed on the authority of Kahriger and Lewis. The dissent
could not comprehend how the majority could at once profess to
accept Congress' power to tax illegal activities and then strip it of
the power to make such taxing schemes effective. Noting that the
registration and disclosure requirements extended to both lawful
and unlawful activities, he concluded that such provisions must
have been imposed to aid in the collection of legitimately levied
taxes. Arguing that Congress must effectively subject the pro-
ceeds of outlawed gambling transactions to these legitimate taxing
powers, he maintained that this goal could only be accomplished
by requiring gamblers, under the threat of criminal sanction, to
step forward and reveal the nature and scope of their necessarily
secret activities. Furthermore, it was the dissent's position that,
since disclosure by registration was a common feature of many
regulatory taxes levied against persons in lawful businesses, the
effect of the majority's decision in relieving gamblers of such re-
quirements would be to create for such gamblers a special privi-
lege of non-registration. Mr. Chief Justice Warren also found it
difficult to follow the majority's reasoning in refusing to impose
"use restrictions" on the ground that it would defeat the con-
gressional purpose of making such information available to state
authorities. The Chief Justice felt that the Court's sweeping con-
stitutional ruling frustrated the more significant and certainly valid
congressional purpose of obtaining revenue. It was argued that
the $115,000,000 in wagering taxes that have been collected in
recent years is sufficient evidence of a legitimate tax. purpose. It
would appear, however, that the strongest contention was that
the Court had failed to take into consideration the primary impli-
cations of their decision in relation to the other registration and
occupational tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
The immediate impact of the Marchetti and Grosso decisions
will probably be effectuated in a series of constitutional defenses
to violations of other sections of the Code which are similar in
form and substance to the Federal Wagering Stamp Tax Act.
There are a number of such regulatory statutes in Title 26,53 and
while provisions of this type have been consistently upheld as
constitutional, 4 there still remains the question of whether the
52Id. at 77 (dissenting opinion). There were also two separate con-
curring opinions by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart. Id.
at 72, 76.
53 See, e.g., INT. Ry. CoDE of 1954 §4722 (dealers in narcotic drugs);
§4753 (dealers in marihuana); § 5179 (registration of stills); § 5802
(importers, manufacturers and dealers in certain firearms).
54 United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950) (upheld imposition of
tax on transfers of marihuana made without the required order form);
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937) (upheld regulatory pro-
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privilege against self-incrimination is now a defense to violations
of them. These registration and occupational tax provisions, like
those of the wagering stamp tax, are directed toward a group or
groups "inherently suspect of criminal activities." It is clear, there-
fore, that they too are open to attack on the ground that they
create "real and appreciable" hazards of self-incrimination.
Furthermore, it is reasonable to argue that the Marchetti and
Grosso holdings will have an even broader effect. Registration
provisions not associated with the various occupational tax schemes,
but which do concern allegedly illegal activities, may be placed in
a similar position. An example is the provision regulating border
crossings by narcotics addicts,-5 which requires that addicts and
people who have violated certain narcotic and marihuana laws
register with a customs official whenever departing from or enter-
ing the United States. Alleged violators of this provision have
previously been denied the use of the privilege against self-in-
crimination as a defense.56 However, if the principles set down
by the Court in Marchetti and Grosso are to be uniformly ob-
served, it would appear that alleged violators of such provisions
must also be given the same protection.
The defense of self-incrimination has already been success-
fully asserted in cases involving the registration 57 and illegal
possession5 8 provisions of the National Firearms Act. In Haynes
v. United States,5 9 the Court reversed a conviction for knowingly
possessing a firearm that had not been properly registered under
Section 5841 of the Act. The Court held that compliance with the
registration requirements would, in effect, have compelled peti-
tioner to incriminate himself. Since the registration section was
directed primarily at those persons who acquired the defined fire-
arms without complying with the Act's other provisions, they
would thus be immediately threatened with criminal prosecutions
under the two penal sections of the same Act.60 The Court there-
fore held that a proper assertion of the self-incrimination privi-
lege would constitute a complete defense to any prosecution for
visions of National Firearms Act as valid taxes); Nigro v. United States,
276 U.S. 332 (1928) (upheld registration provisions of Anti-Narcotic Act
as valid taxes).
5- 18 U.S.C. § 1407(a)-(b) (1964).
5cUnited States v. Eramdjian, 155 F. Supp. 914, 931 (S.D. Cal. 1957),
held that section 1407 did not violate the fifth amendment's self-incrimina-
tion clause because it did not compel the direct confession of the com-
mission of a crime.
57 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 5841.
5
s INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 5851.
5D390 U.S. 85 (1968).
G0The Court reached this conclusion because persons who made fire-
arms, or obtained such by transfer or importation, were not required to
register as long as they complied with the provisions concerning transfer,
making and importation. Id. at 96.
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failure to register under section 5841 or for illegal possession
under section 5851.
These new interpretations of the scope of the fifth amend-
ment's self-incrimination privilege seem to clarify the protection
that is actually being offered. It appears that the Court believes
that the privilege must be extended to all individuals who are
operating within the private spheres of society without regard to
the nature of the criminal activity with which they are charged.
It is only in this way that the protection offered by the Constitu-
tion can be truly effectuated.
This line of thought leads one to question whether these
recent decisions are improperly upsetting the balance between the
government's need for information and the private rights of the
individual. It is arguable that these broad interpretations of the
privilege will create new hazards and burdens that will impede
law enforcement agencies in their attempts to acquire information
vital to effective crime prevention. As far as illegal gambling
activities are concerned, law enforcement officials generally agree
that gambling and ancillary activities provide the largest single
source of revenue available to organized crime in the United
States." ' In fact, while there exists no accurate method of com-
puting crime's gross annual income from gambling, reliable esti-
mates have placed the figure at between seven and fifty billion
dollars. Illegal wagering on horse racing, lotteries and sporting
events accounts for at least twenty billion dollars a year . 2
Due to the lucrative nature of professional gambling, it is in
the public interest not only that the income therefrom be taxed,
but also that this activity be discouraged. It is not so readily ap-
parent, however, that the compulsory disclosure provisions of the
wagering stamp tax have significantly contributed to the attain-
ment of the latter of these two goals. In light of the incriminatory
nature of the information required by the wagering tax scheme
and the vast network of state gambling statutes that have been
cited, a common sense appraisal would indicate that only the most
secure or naive of gamblers would risk the possibility of prosecu-
tion by complying with the tax's registration provisions. And
the statistics as to the amount of revenue actually collected under
the Act seem to add validity to this assumption. Not only did
the Act fall far short of its expected revenue intake in the first
months of its operation, 63 but also Chief Justice Warren's figures
as to the one hundred fifteen million dollars collected under the Act
61 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADIINISTRA-
TION OF JusTICE, TASK FORCE RFPORT 1967 at 188.
62 Id. at 189.
61 Comment, The Federal Gambling Tax and the Constitution, 43 J. CGIm.
L.C. & P.S. 637 n.11 (1953).
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in recent years is entirely inconsistent with the estimated seven to
fifty billion dollars per year income. This disparity seems to indi-
cate that only a small percentage of professional gamblers actually
comply with the wagering tax statutes. Such a conclusion would
lead one to seriously question any contention that the Act as imple-
mented in the past served as a vital and essential enforcement
tool in the area of gambling control. In attempting to resolve
the conflict between the needs of the government and the liberties
of the individual, it must be remembered that the essential mean-
ing of the fifth amendment has never before been, contravened.
The limited efficiency with which the Act operates as a penal
measure can certainly afford no justification for any attempt to
sacrifice the substantial rights guaranteed to the individual in
order to facilitate the procedural obligations of the government.
It may be argued that the Court reached its decision here
by looking into the motive behind the creation of this tax which
was apparently to discourage illegal gambling.64 Such an approach
would be unjustified in light of the well-established rule that the
judiciary, in determining the validity of a legislative enactment,
will not inquire into the hidden motives or reasons which move
the legislature to exercise its constitutional powers. 5 It is the
opinion of this author, however, that such was not the case in
the instant decision. In neither Marchetti nor Grosso was the
Act itself invalidated as an unconstitutional exercise of the federal
taxing power. The Court found issue only with the unconstitu-
tional effects that the application of the Act produced in relation
to the self-incrimination privilege. Furthermore, as the Court
stated :
If, in different circumstances, a taxpayer is not confronted by substan-
tial hazards of self-incrimination, or if he is otherwise outside the
privilege's protection, nothing we decide today would shield him from
the various penalties prescribed by the wagering tax statutes.66
Thus, while the Court may have made some incidental references
to motive in the opinion, the holding itself was a result of the
subsequent unconstitutional application of the registration require-
ments of the Act.
In so declaring the effects of the scheme unconstitutional, the
Court has left Congress with the option of either leaving the
Act as is, or reenacting the Act in such a manner that its appli-
cation would not constitute an infringement upon the self-incrimi-
nation privilege. Congress could only accomplish such a reenact-
'4 See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 27 n.3 (1953); Comment,
supra note 63, at 637; 67 HAV. L. REV. 164 (1953).
- See Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
66 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 61 (1968).
196S ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ment through a statutory amendment to the taxing scheme by
which "absolute immunity" against self-incrimination, satisfying
those standards first established in Couelman, would be guaran-
teed. Such an amendment would necessarily involve the imposi-
tion of "use restrictions" like those levied in Murphy and would
have to provide that the registrant could "not be investigated or
prosecuted, by either the federal or the state government, on the
basis of information compelled by the tax law." 67 However, in
view of the amount of revenue produced and the fact that the
primary motive behind enactment was to aid in the enforcement
of state anti-gambling statutes, it seems highly unlikely that
Congress will reenact the statute with the necessary protections.
In rendering the Marchetti and Grosso decisions, the Supreme
Court has not imposed any radical changes upon the scope of the
fifth amendment. Rather, the Court has merely returned to the
traditional tests by which the privilege has been applied in Boyes
and the later American cases. The Court realistically determined
whether a "real and appreciable hazard of self-incrimination" was
present, and finding that there was, it held the privilege appli-
cable.
The Court has in no way diminished the Kahriger conclu-
sions as to the Act's validity as a taxing measure. As was said,
if reenacted with the proper protections, the Court would most
likely uphold the provisions in their entirety. What the Court
has made clear is that all private individuals, including those who
may be involved in allegedly illegal activities, are entitled to pro-
tection under the self-incrimination clause. Such a clarification is
both correct and necessary if the rights guaranteed under the
fifth amendment are to be effective. The only possible detri-
mental effects of such a decision may be in the law enforcement
area. The limited role which the Act actually had in that area
indicates that government agencies should be able to find an
adequate and realistic alternative. Thus, it does appear that the
other occupational tax and registration provisions of the Code,
similar in form and effect to those of the wagering stamp tax,
will be challenged with the same results. It is only in this way
that the Supreme Court can maintain the fifth amendment's self-
incrimination privilege as it was intended to be applied.
16 Note, Self-Incrimination and the Federal Excise Tax on Wagering,
76 YALE L. J. 839, 844 (1967).
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